Disputes: The agreement should specify what happens when a dispute arises. This may include share sales, voting rights and dispute resolution procedures. Another part of the doctrine assumes that these clauses would be valid. According to this doctrine, there is no text prohibiting the transfer of voting rights, so that, like the other rights attached to the share, it would be a specific right of the shareholder who could freely dispose of it. This part of the doctrine can support their position and base their thesis on the recent reform of the CCA. In fact, with the reform of the CCA in 2016, Parliament has largely weakened the essential and sacredness of the right to vote. In particular, by authorising shares without voting rights, without the need to add preferential financial rights, by suspending the voting rights of certain shareholders defaulting by the management body or by renouncing shareholders to all or part of their voting rights.  Such as its inclusion in the articles of the corporation, its application to all shareholders and its application to all securities that confer voting rights. Voting rules can be quite complex. As a shareholder, you need to think about this before entering into a shareholders` agreement.
You must ensure that no party has full control over the decisions to be made by shareholders, especially when it comes to critical business matters that could seriously affect you. In addition, you need to think about the future and how the holdings could change. For example, is it likely that additional shareholders will invest in the company and how might this affect you? Does this mean that you no longer have control over certain decisions? This explanatory and empirical presentation has normative implications for some of the most fundamental debates in company law. For example, understanding shareholder agreements calls into question two key differences in company law: that control of the board of directors should be accompanied by fiduciary duties, while the mere exercise of contractual rights should not, and that shareholders negotiate discretionary „residual control rights“, while other stakeholders, like creditors, protect themselves contractually. The full use of contractual rights by shareholders forces us to reconsider the type of control on both fronts. . . .